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Abstract. The article analyzes aspects of the relationship between evolution and bio-
logical complexity and the attempts made by scholars and theologians to interpret it 
within the limits of reductionist scientism or theism. For this purpose, firstly, attention 
is focused on explaining the meaning of the concept of «evolution» and its historical 
and philosophical transformation in the context of the idea of complexity. Secondly, the 
notion of complexity in theology is used as evidence to support teleology. This approach 
is criticized by some scholars who consider evolution as a random prosses. They give 
it the status of a universal metaphysical assumption in evolution. The scientists and 
theologists both formulate metaphysical assumptions differently to interpret evolution.
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Introduction 
The concept of «evolution» is widespread and popular because it is used far 
beyond biology. In biology, this concept came from the philosophy where it 
originated (Juncker, Scherer 2002, 21–22). Evolution is firmly entrenched 
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in biological vocabulary, and in general, biologists agree about its inter-
pretation (Futuyma 2013; Freeman and Herron 2013). Although it would 
be inaccurate to say that it is not necessary to clarify the primary meaning 
and definition of the concept of «evolution». A contradictory interpretation 
of «evolution» can be related to what ideas will be part of its content or 
meaning (Millstein 2017). The ideas of direction, complexity, randomness, 
necessity, etc., can be part of the interpretation of the term «evolution» 
and become a common thematic research field for science and theology. 
This assumption is possible because the evolutionary interpretation of the 
processes of biological life has been significantly influencing the religious 
interpretation of the world and humanity. 
Despite some researchers’ remarks, the explanation of evolutionary 
processes poses no threat to the teleological argument in theism (Smedt, 
Cruz 2020, 6–7). As a process, evolution provokes a negative reaction from 
theologians only if given a sufficiently one-sided and simplistic interpre-
tation because of the reductionism of individual scientists or materialist 
promoters of science. The scientists give their interpretation of evolution 
a universal status as the physical law. Therefore, it is necessary to find out 
the ideas that can be part of the meaning of evolution and how empirical 
data and its interpretation influence the confirmation or refutation of those 
ideas. It is crucial to find out whether reductionism follows from the theory 
of evolution since all.
It should be noted that most theologians and scholars agree with the 
existence of the interconnection of all living things (Barbour 1990; Polk-
inghorne 1994; Behe 2006; Küng 2007). Sometimes, it is believed that the 
differences in the interpretation of natural processes by science and religion 
are due to different terminology (Strumilowski Ocist 2019). This connec-
tion is the evolution treated by reductionists as the adaptation through 
random mutations from simpler life forms to more complex ones. Even 
the interpretation of evolution from reductionism’s point of view requires 
an appeal to a certain kind of metaphysical assumption. One should agree 
that evolution’s very notion will depend on the grounds and arguments for 
interpreting certain metaphysical assumptions.
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With this in mind, let us consider the concept of «evolution» from its 
inception and the gradual historic transformation of its content. We shall 
show that a part of the content of evolution is the notion of complexity. To 
clarify the possibility of forming certain interpretations of evolution, let us 
consider how the idea of complexity emerged and why it is associated with 
the concepts of progress, goal, and intention. In the third part of the article, 
we shall demonstrate how metaphysical assumptions are formed based on 
universal concepts. By comparing the concepts of Jacques Lucien Monod, 
Clinton Richard Dawkins, Paul Davies, John Polkinghorne, and Hans Küng, 
we will discern the difference in the ability of science and theology to use 
metaphysical assumptions in interpreting the consequences of evolutionary 
teaching.
1. Evolution: historical transformation  
of concepts and ideas
The need to explain the meaning of «evolution» to avoid an incorrect de-
scription of objects and phenomena may not appear very original. Biologists 
believe that the concept of «evolution» has a fixed meaning, and therefore 
do not pay much attention to its explanation. It is more common for the 
scholars in other disciplines, namely, philosophers and theologians, to claim 
that the concept of «evolution» is ambiguous and that its application should 
be delimited according to its functional purpose (Collins 2003, 256; Davies 
2004, 126). There is a distinction between the general biological concept 
of «evolution» and the universal concept (Collins 2003, 257). For example, 
Ayala said, «Evolution, theory in biology postulating that the various types 
of plants, animals, and other living things on Earth have their origin in 
other preexisting types and that the distinguishable differences are due to 
modifications in successive generations. The theory of evolution is one of 
the fundamental keystones of modern biological theory» (Ayala 2019). This 
definition is quite consistent with the formal requirements for a biological 
notion. However, since this is an analysis of the use and extrapolation of 
evolution into the field beyond biology, there is a need to clarify the term’s 
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etymology and function. Sometimes biologists seek to give this definition 
of «evolution» a universal status, and this becomes something different 
(Junker, Scherer 2002, 18; National Association of Biology Teachers 2008).
The Latin word «evolutio» means the unfolding, that is, the process of 
moving from narrower to wider, from smaller to larger, from simpler to more 
complex. Unfolding has several meanings, including «… straighten something 
folded; … to give something its natural form; … to make something accessi-
ble, open to sight.» This explanation of «evolution» can be supplemented. If 
«evolution» is a process of unfolding, then it means that the unfolded is taken 
from what has been laid, planned, existed in some other form (potential), 
but became real (material). In this interpretation, a teleological argument 
arises, namely, if a particular process unfolds from a potential to a real one, 
then it must have a particular focus on something, be for something, or have 
a specific purpose. Aristotle first formulated the teleological argument of 
explaining the origin and interconnection of all living things. This ancient 
thinker developed a system of classification of all living things in nature. 
His system has a hierarchical structure and purposiveness, that is, the 
explanation for the existence of all living organisms (Edelstein 1944, 150). 
The teleological character of Aristotle’s concept influenced the Christian 
interpretation of the development of life, in particular. His interpretation 
was approved by Saint Augustine in the Middle Ages. The medieval thinker 
undertook to incorporate Aristotle’s teleological conception into Christian 
doctrine, stating that «No maker is more excellent than God, no design is 
more efficacious than God’s Word…» (Augustine 2018, 229). Later, in the 
17th century, Archbishop James Ussher, following Aristotle’s teaching on 
the Great Chain of Being in Genesis, claimed that «God created an infinite 
and continuous series of life forms, each one grading into the next, from 
simplest to most complex, and that all organisms, including humans, were 
created in their present form relatively recently and that they have remained 
unchanged since then» (Palomar 2012). Ussher did not favour evolutionary 
theory or evolutionism in their modern sense. However, in the very idea 
that God creates forms from simpler to more complex, one can see some 
features of evolution, namely, the transition from simple to complex. Such an 
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assumption justifies the teleology of biological life and can be interpreted as 
a kind of synthesis of evolution and the idea of creation. Therefore, we cannot 
completely reject the assumption that the concept of «evolution» contains 
the purpose and the idea of complexity, particularly the development from 
simple to complex. Kant believed that our ideas about the direction of the 
development of living processes are related to a mechanistic understanding 
of the world. For him, living organisms are complex systems that are, in 
many ways, similar to complex artifacts made by humans (Ginsborg 2014). 
However, Kant states that the ability to reproduce and regenerate living 
systems is a sign of an absolutely new level. Kant’s teleological argument 
has a goal that can be explained within naturalism (Allen, Neal 2019). Here 
we can see a noticeable change compared to previous ideas about life. In 
Kant’s account, naturalism does not deny the existence of the Creator but 
changes the supernatural mechanisms of evolution’s orientation to natural 
mechanisms. Unlike Haeckel, Kant does not consider a mechanism to be 
sufficient for explaining biological life (Kolb 1992, 9). It can be assumed that 
this leaves room for an idea of a certain desire for the orderliness of life.
One way or another, initially using the term «evolution» to refer to 
processes in biology, scientists transfer its meaning and neglect its origins. 
We suggest that since Darwin’s time, this neglect has had a generally recog-
nized status in biology (Junker, Scherer 2002, 24–25). The problem is that 
biologists commonly define the evolutionary process as something more 
significant, such as seen in the statement from the National Association of 
Biology Teachers (National Association of Biology Teachers 2008). Using 
the concept of «evolution», biologists refine its primary meaning, namely, 
removing from it the purposiveness (teleology) and complexity (the idea of 
higher development). Purposiveness and complexity are interrelated. One 
can even state that complexity is an argument to confirm purposiveness, 
the so-called «irreducible complexity» (Junker, Scherer 2006, 306). How-
ever, these concepts contradict the biologically acceptable notion of the 
neutrality of life-occurring processes, the emergence of species, etc., which 
are not subject to any guiding principles but to a combination of random 
gene changes and environmental influences. The purpose of evolution 
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helps explain why a complex form of life emerges from the simple forms of 
biological life (Davies 2004, 111–112; Junker, Scherer 2002, 315–316). Only 
the expediency can explain the «desire» of life to reach an increased level 
of complexity. However, it is natural to ask biologists whether the desire 
to hold the idea of the universality of the theory of evolution is contrary 
to the principle of scientific objectivity. Is the idea of «evolution» without 
expediency and complexity, not an attempt to bring empirical data to 
a ready-made theory?
2. The concept of complexity and its origin
In modern biology, the complexity of biological life is problematic in the 
context of the interpretation of evolution. Its explanation is not reflected 
in the Declaration of Evolution, formulated by modern biologists (National 
Association of Biology Teachers 2008). Some researchers note that it is 
necessary to differentiate the concepts of evolutionary development and 
progress when it comes to evolution and its «orientation» towards complexity 
(Collins 2003, 280–281). The rejection of differentiation will result in the 
identification of the concepts of «evolution», «evolutionism», and «evolu-
tionary theory». One could agree with this, but biologists sometimes seek 
to universalize evolutionary theory. In such circumstances, it is equated 
with evolutionism. The orientation towards progressive development gives 
evolution a direction, and this idea contradicts the «desire» of biologists 
to create the concept of «neutral» evolution. However, all the empirical 
evidence of the evolution of life on Earth supports a «progressive» evolution. 
This concept of evolution is the development in time (following the arrow 
of time from the past into the future) of the living from simpler to more 
complex or the emergence of life as such.
Initially, complexity in Ancient European philosophy was not equated 
with perfection, progress, etc. Plato believed that everything complex is not 
perfect because it consists of parts. The individual part is not independent, 
has no functional meaning in itself, unlike that which is integral, indivisible, 
and does not consist of separate parts. Hence comes the ancient notion that 
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the soul is perfect and the body is not, because it consists of parts: «the soul 
is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always 
the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, 
multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the same» (Plato 
1997, 70). The notion of perfection of the simple was also manifested in 
ancient philosophers’ interpretation of cases with complex movement. In 
particular, Aristotle regarded it as a separate case of movement in a circle. 
The movement in a circle was considered perfect, absolute, and all other 
movement types are reduced as imperfect. Due to this, one can see the first 
signs of the idea that everything can be explained through the simple, and 
it will manifest later in physics and biology.
So when did the European philosophical tradition its perception of the 
relation of the perfect, the progressive, and the complex? We can assume that 
this was due to a combination of ideas about the Creator and the created. 
The intellectually grounded doctrine of the Creator was finally formed in 
medieval philosophy, particularly from the ideas of the Platonic Demiurge 
and Aristotle’s teleology. In the «Confessions» of Augustine, what is created 
by the Creator is presented as good and is included in the associated series 
of complex and harmonic. «All beautiful bodies also express this; for a body 
which consists of members, all of which are beautiful, is by far more beautiful 
than the several members individually are by whose well-ordered union 
the whole is completed, though these members also be severally beautiful» 
(Augustine 1876, 387). The created has the status of «good» «Because it is 
from Him who is not in any degree, but He is that He is» (Augustine 1876, 
390). The creation is conceived and planned, having a purpose through its 
Creator. However, such an idea is not sufficient to explain why the created 
causes compound creations with complexity. The completion of the trans-
formation of the value of complexity can be explained by the interpretation 
of the role of a man and human intelligence in the process of creation. In the 
Middle Ages, people were not yet likened to God in their ability to create. 
The image of the human Creator appears in the Renaissance. Renaissance 
thinkers saw the harmony of the world, which they understood as perfection, 
and that was the consequence of the world being made in «the image of God». 
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Giordano Bruno explained that the world is a harmonious work of God that 
can be studied by analogy with works of art (Tatarkiewicz 1999, 17). God 
the Creator, and man as the artist-creator. Such an analogy gives rise to the 
interpretation of the process of creation as directed toward a specific goal 
and the completion of a design. The creation process is complicated because 
it is always a combination of different elements that are intermediate 
links from idea to the embodiment. Achieving the ultimate goal is always 
a multilevel process, and, in modern scientific language, it is non-linear. 
Completed creation is a sign of complexity, so there must have been the one 
who conceived and created it. The development of science and the formation 
of mechanicism (Galileo, Newton) had two key implications for changing 
complexity perceptions. The first is that any system’s complexity can be 
explained much more simply than was previously thought, and the second 
is that the Creator is not an artist, but rather an engineer. Creative artistic 
nonlinearity has been replaced by mechanical engineering linearity. Such 
ideas have been confirmed in practice, e.g., the development of mechanical 
production. To all this, the authority of Newtonian mechanics was confirmed 
by the universality of the law of gravitation which he had discovered and 
together with Kepler’s laws that seemed to explain everything they called 
κόσμος, harmony, and order. All the grounds for interpreting complexity 
within deism have arisen.
The discoveries found while researching biological organisms showed 
that the notion about life in the meaning of complex mechanism was 
premature. The very word organism comes from the Latin «organismus» or 
«organizo», which means to tune, to give a clear structure. It contrasts sharply 
with the ancient Greek concept of ὄργανον, which meant an instrument, 
but it completely fitted into the ancient notion of the imperfection of the 
complex, that comprising of parts. In science from the 18th century and till 
the 20th-century, an organism is fundamentally different from a mechanism 
because it has three levels: molecular, cellular, and tissue. It became obvious 
that bringing the understanding of life to the physical and chemical levels 
is quite problematic. The assumption that the phenomenon of life can be 
explained on the basis of simple determinism was a naive reductionism.
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The success of biology and physiology in the 19th century explained 
the difference between animate and inanimate and the impossibility of 
identifying them, though it led to another problem. Establishing a physio-
logical similarity between a human and other living beings overshadowed 
the fundamental difference between them. A human is always a unique 
personality. In other words, personality is one more, a higher level of com-
plexity. This interpretation has a tradition well known in theology. Its roots 
can be seen in the concept of Augustine (Berry 2017, 95–99). This tradition 
contrasts with the approach of modern science. Science tends to simplify 
and reduce the personality purely to the network of neurons in the brain. 
It blurs the line between a living person, a personality, and the processes in 
his\her brain. A human can love and suffer. It would not be possible without 
the high level of complexity of the nervous system and brain. Can science 
explain, taking only on principles of evolutionism, what is the advantage 
of the human’s ability to love, suffer, and sympathize? The uniqueness of 
a human for theology is incomparably higher than for science. Theologians 
believe that the ability to love and be faithful is inherent in God himself and, 
therefore, inherent in humans as his likeness (Polkinghorne 1988; Peacocke 
1990, 121). The interpretation of life`s complexity explains its necessity 
and value, and reductionism in science can only assume its randomness.
3. Interpretation of the relationship between evolution  
and the complexity of life in science and theology
The functioning of biological organisms and the discovery of cellular struc-
ture has led to the understanding that life is a combination of sufficiently 
complex processes at different levels. Although the base of the living and 
the inanimate is on the level of elementary particles, life is much more 
complicated precisely because of its organization level. The structure of the 
organization of biological life includes regulation, control, and adaptation, 
the interaction of which determines the evolutionary processes at the 
level of an individual organism and species (Mainzer 2015, 185–186). The 
complexity is also manifested in the fact that all biological processes can not 
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be simplified deterministically to elementary particles (Schrödinger). A new 
level of organization means new characteristics. However, they are related, 
and both their chemical and physical properties affect the functioning of 
the biological organism. Without them, complex metabolic networks would 
not be possible.
Explaining all the details of biological complexity is directly related to 
whether evolution can be considered universal (Juncker, Scherer 2002, 47). 
It is necessary to find explanations for the transformation mechanisms from 
unicellular organisms to humans (Juncker, Scherer 2002, 47). It is necessary 
to explain the essence of complex life if simple organisms are adapted well 
enough, and why the nervous system, brain, etc. emerge. If one rejects any 
direction to evolution, it is necessary to abandon the fact that the direction 
of evolution may be an adaptation, survival of the species, etc. However, the 
problem of complexity in evolution cannot be eliminated in such a simple 
way. Proponents of the universal action of randomness in evolutionary 
processes often use an argument that has a tautology in its essence: «Those 
organisms that are better suited for survival will survive more successfully.» 
This assertion has undergone a well-founded criticism (Davies 2004, 126). 
Not only is this argument tautological, but its problem is also that it cannot 
be empirically verified or reproduced. It is not reproducible in time, because 
the survival would have occurred in the past under unknown conditions. 
For example, is it possible to explain the nervous system’s appearance, eye, 
or brain at some stage of evolution due to random events? Biologists have 
well understood this problem since the mid-20th century.
French molecular biologist Jacques Monod has taken a critical view of 
the concept of «evolution» in a sense it has had etymologically, traditionally, 
and it was similar to dialectical materialism.One can assume that he opposes 
a notion of «evolution», which contains ideas of progressive orientation and 
complexity (Monod 1972, 44). Although Monod does not mention this, in 
fact, he changes the concept of causality in discussing the emergence of life 
and the formation of new biologically complex species. Causality cannot 
be determined by purposiveness, since changes in organisms considered 
adaptive are random. There can be many factors that determine changes at 
8(2)/2020 361
S C I E N T I F I C A N D T H E O LO G I CA L R E S PO N S E S. . .
the level of molecules, so it is impossible to predict their influence over an 
organism’s mutation, as their variability is difficult to predict. Changes in 
DNA occur spontaneously and unpredictably, so there are no mechanisms of 
universal evolution. Monod eliminates any options for interpreting matter 
or unreasonable nature as being endowed with special «vital» properties 
(Bergson, de Chardin). Admittedly, he rightly regards them as unscientific.
Analyzing his ideas, we can assume that he opposes the creation of 
any outlook position that biology disproves. By rejecting the possibility 
of «progressive and directed evolution», Monod refutes the materialist 
Marxist interpretation of matter development. This means that evolutionary 
processes cannot be understood or predicted. Merely a case in which there is 
no pattern, and therefore it is complicated, if not impossible, to reconstruct 
life conditions. Monod’s arguments have implications for the interpretation 
of the complexity of life and biological organisms. Complexity is accidental 
since it is a coincidence of circumstances and conditions of the properties of 
fundamental physical and chemical processes. This assumption shows that 
there is no directionally progressive evolution. It can be thus concluded that 
the interpretation of the processes of life formation and their functioning 
does not give grounds to expect that a universal theory of evolutionary 
development with laws is possible (Monod 1972). Empirical data from 
research findings support the concept of Monod.
Monod’s concept became the basis for the ideological justification 
of the criticism by Richard Dawkins of any conception of the direction of 
the evolutionary process and the interpretation of biological complexity. 
Dawkins introduced the concept of the «Blind Watchmaker» as opposed to 
the deistic notion of God-the-Engineer. He criticizes the idea of progressive 
complexity, arguing that living organisms are complex but not perfect, which 
means not progress but adaptation. Monod and Dawkins, in their conception, 
provide randomness with universal character. From empirical evidence 
and hypotheses, they generally derive philosophical principles (Dawkins 
2006, 5). The assumption of chance as a universal, metaphysical, basis makes 
it possible to explain why there is neither hierarchically organized matter 
(dialectical materialism), nor a focus on progressive development (creation). 
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The fallacy here is that Monod and Dawkins do not believe that they for-
mulate a metaphysical thesis, from general to concrete, but rather rely on 
an inductive method. Their approach, going beyond the scientific, however, 
claims to be recognized as scientific. Also, the argument that randomness 
governs everything does not mean abandoning metaphysical assumptions. 
It can rather be interpreted as an attempt to solve the problem in a simple 
way. Is this possible for complex systems such as biological organisms and 
the biosphere as a whole? The assumption of the universality of chance in 
the emergence of biological life may be premature. Computer simulations 
of evolutionary systems demonstrate that specific patterns, the so-called 
evolutionary algorithms, may be found (R. Poli, C.R. Stephens 2014, 19–20). 
The discovery of evolutionary algorithms will not mean the destruction of 
the naturalistic interpretation of origin and nature of biological life. It will 
only refute the universality of the action of chance. However, it will be of 
significance which mechanisms are behind these evolutionary algorithms, 
namely, whether they are similar to those operating at the level of physical 
and chemical processes or whether they have a different fundamental basis.
The controversy surrounding the role of chance in biological processes 
indicates our incomplete knowledge of living systems, or that evolution is not 
universal. It differs from Monod’s views. Even some neo-Darwinists recognize 
this problem. «All one can say is that since the first living organisms were 
presumably very simple, then if any large change has occurred in evolution-
ary lineage, it must have been in the direction of increasing complexity» 
(Maynard-Smith 1969, 82). In the assumption of the universal nature of 
chance there is also the problem of the ratio of utility and randomness. One 
needs to find out if random changes can be considered useful. They may 
even be harmful. Such changes may have a mosaic character or be a kind 
of analogue of «noise», that is, obstacles that distort or diminish useful 
information (Davies 2004, 109). Any organism is very complex, it is a system 
that is configured in a certain way. And even if some biologists believe that 
organisms are adapted to the environment but not perfect (in fact, this is an 
argument against the direction of evolution), organisms are still structured, 
that is, they are complex enough. How mathematically probable is it that 
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such complexity and orderliness result from many random events? «At the 
heart of these misgivings lies the nature of random processes and the laws 
of probability. One does not have to be a mathematician to appreciate that 
the more intricately and delicately a complex system is arranged, the more 
vulnerable it is to degradation by random changes» (Davies 2004, 108). Paul 
Davies disagrees with Monod and Dawkins’ assumption that a series of 
random events have shaped biological organisms’ complexity. He gives an 
example of the biological complexity of the functioning and interaction of 
individual groups of molecules, each of which is a separate unit, but which 
performs the function of a part of the whole (Davies 2004, 100–101). Indi-
vidual behavior is subject to general ordering. Like Monod, Dawkins tends to 
interpret the complex through its reduction to the elements and properties of 
the simple. For example, he explains the complexity of biological organisms’ 
progressive tendency to avoid the loss of order. In such actions, one can see 
the desire to simplify, if not the biological organisms themselves, then at 
least the notion of them in biology. However, we have the reason to believe 
that a simplified understanding of complex biological systems and organisms 
is refuted. Computer simulation and the use of mathematical methods in 
studies of complex systems’ behavior demonstrate that the operation of such 
a complex system as the organism cannot be regarded as a unity of simpler 
ones (Mainzer 2015, 186). It is similar to explaining the functions of DNA 
molecules based on their subatomic particle properties. It can be assumed 
that attempts to simplify the interpretation of complex systems are not 
a universal principle of science, but rather a certain assumption for inter-
preting empirical data for the universalization of all biological processes, 
both in nature in general and in individual organisms. This approach goes 
beyond the purely scientific and again comes out of a worldview nature.
Alternative approaches are also possible, and they will each have fun-
damentally different metaphysical assumptions. They hold that biological 
systems do not arise due to blind chance, but require some «irreducible 
complexity» (Behe 2006, 42). If we do not accept this assumption, «the 
existence of biological systems would be impossible» (Collins 2003, 288). 
The situation is clarified when one considers that biological organisms 
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cannot be regarded as closed systems. Therefore we cannot extrapolate 
over them the characteristics inherent in physical and chemical systems. 
Usually, physical and chemical systems are closed and linear or considered 
as isolated and local systems. Physicists try to regard complex systems as 
special cases of simple systems (Rosen 1987, 315). Similarly, some biologists 
were inclined to explain the properties of a DNA molecule (Monod 1972). 
However, a biological system’s interaction with the external environment 
is much more dynamic, and it is never completely isolated, so they are, 
in reality, open and nonlinear systems. Such systems’ behavior is better 
explained not by the incidental action of many factors, but by external 
interference (Behe 2006, 192–193).
To identify a case of imposed design, you have to find a gap between what we 
see and the processes we know about that might have produced what we see, 
and you have to show that natural processes alone are not enough to bridge 
the gap. That is, there is a gap between the arrangement of the big stones in 
Stonehenge, and the properties of the stones and their environment (such 
as wind, rain, and earthquakes). There is a gap between the message-bearing 
function of DNA and the properties of the chemicals that make it up. There is 
a gap between human capacities for reason, language, and morality, and what 
we find in every other animal. From these gaps we conclude that it took some 
kind of special action, done by an agent, to bridge the gaps (Collins 2003, 289). 
This position is rather weak because it suggests an explanation that con-
tradicts science. However, it should be kept in mind that science is an open 
system of evolving knowledge, and therefore, something not currently 
explained can be explained in the future. The correctness of such an inter-
pretation has been proven over time. The appeal to this argument already 
has its explanation in cognitive religious studies (Alex 2018).
Most theologians tend to accept the idea of evolution because they do 
not consider it contrary to the idea of creation (Polkinghorne 1994, 86; 
Küng 2007, 154; Collins 2003, 298–99). However, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard 
Dawkins, and Francisco Ayala (Dembski 1992) demonstrate that evolution 
and creation are not compatible. Their argument is based on the attempt to 
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present the identification of complexity and perfection allegedly present in 
the concept of creation. None of the theologians believes that complexity 
should be referential, complete, and perfect. On the contrary, if we look for 
evidence that the complexity of living organisms is directed, the ability to 
transform under the influence of the changing external world only empha-
sizes this feature: «A world of hierarchical levels seems to have an inherent 
tendency to move toward emergent complexity, life, and consciousness. 
A patient God could have endowed matter with diverse potentialities and 
let it create more complex forms on its own» (Barbour 1997, 246).
Küng is convinced that the basic principles of evolutionary theory are 
undeniable. He acknowledges the validity of Monod’s critical reaction to 
all attempts to introduce into the theory of evolution the notion of «evo-
lutionary force or energy» that drives evolution. This recognition can be 
attributed to the fact that the Swiss theologian clearly separates empirical 
science methods and the «mystery» of the mechanisms of creation. Küng, 
together with other well-known contemporary theologians (Polkinghorne 
1991, 46; Barbour 1990, 122), urge that God the Creator should not play the 
role of the one covering up the unknown, that of unfinished knowledge, and 
the God of «blind spots». Randomness, as Küng stresses, in no way under-
mines the existence of laws. He considers neither accident nor pattern to be 
universal. It is their common effect, which is universal. It is not a synthesis, 
nor a dialectical unity and development of opposites, but an influence on 
the organization of complex systems. The Swiss theologian interprets this 
randomness in terms of chaos theory.
In fact, such a system, in which solutions are irregular and periods cannot be 
established, can be predicted at best in the short term and in the long term not at 
all. The network of causal partial systems is so complicated that the resultant pat-
tern of movement seems to be “chance”. Chaos theory nevertheless now attempts 
with the help of computers to give a mathematical and physical description of 
such dynamic systems (for example, in fluid mechanics, electronics, or quantum 
mechanics) characterized by a determined chance behavior and the formation 
of chaotic structures. All this means that causal connections remain even in 
“chaos” and order can be established even in chaotic disorder (Küng 2007, 142).
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Randomness is not completely accidental and not universal. It is a testament 
to the complexity of organized systems (Küng 2007, 143). Randomness 
creates the opportunity for variability and the emergence of new structures. 
Thus, modeling the behavior of complex systems using empirical data 
provides no basis to reject the interconnection between the complexity 
of biological life and the direction of evolution (Küng 2007, 143–144). 
Regularity outlines the limits of the realization of chance, which leaves 
arguments for interpreting the direction of evolution and teleology. It avoids 
the «blending» of scientific and theological. Like some other theologians 
(Polkinghorne 1994, 79), he brings out the idea of creation beyond the 
narrow limits of the Creator’s mechanisms of action in the conditions and 
parameters of empirically given material reality. In his explanation, Küng 
does not go beyond the tasks that confront theology. Scientific knowledge 
is not reliable for metaphysical assumptions, and theology can interpret 
scientific knowledge within metaphysical assumptions (Küng 2007, 144–145).
Conclusions
It can be concluded that the concept of «evolution» has a more ancient 
origin than the basic principles of the modern theory of evolution, and this 
has led to differences in the definition of the concept in different fields 
of knowledge. It is important to note that the concept of «evolution» has 
been substantially related to the Christian ideas of creation and teleology. 
This laid the ground for a confrontation between biologists who reject 
teleological evolution and theologians. The use of the idea of the complexity 
of biological life, which is interpreted by theologians as proof of teleology 
and «progressive» evolution, has led to criticism by some scholars. This 
criticism led to a change in the most fundamental principles in interpreting 
evolution, namely, to a revision of its metaphysical assumptions about 
the causes of complex biological systems’ emergence and development. 
Some scientists (Monod, Dawkins), using empirical data, made attempts to 
prove that beyond the natural, unreasonable, and incidental boundaries, 
teleology and intelligent design are not noticeable, but these attempts 
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can be considered as non-science. Based on scientific data interpretation, 
they formulate metaphysical assumptions about evolution, contrary to the 
principle of scientific objectivity. On the other hand, modern theologians 
do not seek to equate theology with the natural sciences in explaining the 
mechanisms of the origin of life, because it is beyond the scope of its tasks, 
which, above all, damages the theistic conception of the Creator. Further 
exploration of the interpretation of the concept of «evolution» and the idea 
of complexity may better understand which processes can be considered 
evolutionary. An additional search for notions (linearity, nonlinearity, 
hierarchy, and synergy) is needed that can influence the meaning of the 
concept of «evolution», which will contribute to a consistent understanding 
of the term and avoidance of metaphysical speculation.
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